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FOREWORD
In December of each year the analysts at the Strategic
Studies Institute (SSI) look to the year ahead to assess the
strategic equation for their particular areas of interest. This
is part of an effort to focus our priorities both corporately as
well as individually.
As they address those issues and factors that will affect
U.S. national security strategy over the next 12-18 months, our
analysts are also forced to think about the next decade. The
strategic context in 1997 will be quite similar to that of 1996
in that it remains complex and uncertain. This year, however, the
way we assess the world of the 21st century is even more
important because the Army, along with the other services, is
engaged in the congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR).
Beyond the QDR, our conceptions of the future have
implications not only for Force XXI and Army XXI, but also for
the kind of Army that will serve the nation when Army XXI systems
near obsolescence in 15-20 years. Getting the strategic context
about right is important because the Army After Next, although
highly capable, will also be small by comparison to those forces
of only a few years past. Furthermore, decisions made in 1997 as
to weapons development and force structure will emerge in the
Army of 2010-2015.
SSI offers this year's World View assessment in the hope
that it will be of value to strategic planners in the Army and to
others who share an interest in assuring that the Army of the
21st century will be then, as it is today, the world's best
army.
RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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INTRODUCTION
Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
The Army and Society.
Each January the analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI), U.S. Army War College, assess domestic and global trends
for the year ahead and beyond as part of a process for devising a
strategic context that may be used by Army planners and other
policymakers. At this writing, the Army's approach to the future,
along with that of the other services, confront the ongoing
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the outcome of which may
establish entirely new directions. The global strategic
assessments reached by SSI analysts, when considered in
conjunction with the roles and missions the Army leadership
proposes for the future, will shape SSI's study plan and focus
the efforts of our Strategic Outreach Program.
The Army of the 21st century, from Force XXI through Army
XXI to the Army After Next, will still be America's Army. Both
the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Army will be
defined, perhaps redefined, within the context of the domestic
and strategic environment. The domestic environment will be
largely determined by three general trends: perception of
threats, declining defense budgets, and ever heightened
expectations for technology. These will be linked, inexorably, to
the strategic landscape where a multipolar world produces a
proliferation of threats without giving rise to a significant
peer competitor.
Army XXI will emerge from Force XXI at around the year 2000.
While it truly will be an Information Age, digitized Army, it
will not be radically different from the Army of today.
By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Army XXI
will be nearing obsolescence in terms of weapons and equipment
designed in the 1980s and 1990s. Decisions made before the turn
of the century, some as a part of this year's QDR process, will
determine the shape of the Army After Next, the force that will
begin to evolve after 2010.
On the foreseeable strategic landscape, there seems very
little possibility of a global war involving the United States or
its allies. That does not, however, preclude the possibility of a
regional war of considerable intensity. The strategic
international environment, however, is likely to remain unsettled
through the decade and the armed forces of the United States will
remain engaged throughout the world. Even though it is highly
unlikely that the United States will find itself threatened by a
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true global peer competitor, Russia, China, Japan and possibly
India have the potential to become regional peer competitors and
might very well threaten each other or their neighbors. The
possibility of war with Iran, Iraq, or North Korea cannot be
discounted. Before the year 2000 each of these nations will have
missiles that can deliver chemical, biological, and quite
possibly nuclear weapons, over great distances. While a war with
any one of these countries would not be "major" in the classical
sense, war with two or more of them would be quite challenging
and the outcome might be problematic, especially if U.S. armed
forces contract further or fail to attain key mobility and
modernizatin objectives.
Russia's continuing descent into economic and political
chaos will keep it from posing a major conventional military
threat beyond its immediate borders. On the other hand, there are
many nuclear weapons in Russia and, given the country's current
state of quasi-anarchy, the kind of threat these weapons pose
cannot be reliably deterred by traditional nuclear strategies.
The Russian armed forces are, and will likely remain, virtually
incapable of conducting sustained military operations on even a
small scale. Russia's nuclear arsenal, however, is robust.
Furthermore, it is not clear the degree to which these forces are
under the command and control of responsible civilian and
military authorities.
In Eastern Europe there are two important strategic issues.
The first issue is threefold in nature: which countries are
admitted to NATO, how Russia accomodates NATO enlargement, and
what happens with those nations who are not among the first to be
admitted. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and quite possibly
Slovenia will be accepted into NATO by the end of the century.
Economic problems, a lack of sufficient progress toward
democratic reforms, and various political and cultural issues
complicate the question for other nations in Eastern Europe.
The second strategically important issue for Eastern Europe
that could affect all of Europe and Russia is how the situation
in Bosnia finally resolves. NATO, Russian, and other European
troops will remain in Bosnia well into 1998, albeit at lower
strength than in 1996. Old animosities are, however, very much
alive and could resurface when the foreign troops are withdrawn.
Reignited violence could foster an attempt to partition Bosnia
between Serbia and Croatia and further test the resolve of the
European community.
From the perspective of the Western European nations, NATO
remains quite viable as the century draws to a close.
Furthermore, the heavy involvement of American forces in Bosnia
has emphasized the fundamental role of the United States in
European security. But the United States and its allies, although
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seeking ways to strengthen their associ-ation, have to be
sensitive to a more "engaged" France and the on-going antagonism
between Greece and Turkey.
Ethnic conflict, economic disintegration, and disease
threaten the security and socio-political viability of SubSaharan Africa. Civil war with accompanying famine and, in some
cases, genocidal acts will be a feature of the African landscape
well into the 21st century. Dysfunctional governments, some on
the verge of collapse, add to the specter of periodic human
disasters of the kind of propor-tions that will tax the will and
resources of the international community. Meanwhile, the dominant
issue in South Africa is how to face the world in the postapartheid era. Ethnic violence, smuggling, and drug trafficking
are among the problems that South Africa's new leadership must
meet to sustain legitimacy and maintain order.
Across the Atlantic, the countries of Latin America will
continue to face the challenges of expanding democratic forms of
government amid continuing economic hardships and problems
associated with increasing populations. Corruption, drug abuse,
terrorism, insurgency, and the threat that the military may
reassert control in a number of countries are among the problems
facing a number of nations. Poverty and desperation will continue
to drive many people into the United States with most of them
entering the country illegally.
The Western Pacific and East Asia have overtaken Europe as
the primary trading arena for the United States. In 1997, the
United States and China will work hard toward forging a better
relationship in the wake of the contentions that arose in 1996
over Taiwan, human rights abuses, proliferation problems, and
trade issues. The Korean peninsula remains a sensitive area and
U.S. forces are likely to remain there as a deterrent well into
the 21st century. Japan and the United States seem to have
clarified their relationship, and by doing so perhaps
strengthened it, following the problems that arose after the rape
of a 12-year-old girl by American servicemen last year.
In the Middle East, two problems could reach the crisis
point in 1997. First, the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is a part
of the continuing confrontation between Iraq and the West,
especially the United States. The Kurdish imbroglio has become a
complicating and potentially explosive problem in an already
dangerous situation. Second, continuing problems between the
Israelis and Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza are
impeding progress in the peace process. Even with some renewal of
progress on Palestinian issues, terrorist acts, many likely
originating in southern Lebanon, will probably foster retaliatory
or preemptive strikes that always hold the potential for wider
violence between Israel and Syria.
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Major Strategic Determinants for 1997 and Beyond.
The analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute have
identified the following 16 major determinants with a potential
to affect U.S. vital or strategic interests, the Army, and the
national military strategy for 1997 and into the first decade of
the 21st century.
• As the Information Age unfolds, the way people relate to
each other and to governments, corporations, and academic and
other institutions will change fundamentally. This will have
implications for how military forces are structured and employed.
• In 1997, the outcome of the QDR will have a major impact
on the armed forces of the United States. As the year begins,
the services are engaged in staking out their various positions.
By March 15, when the Interim Report of the National Defense
Panel is due, these positions should be clear. The real impact of
the QDR will be felt in 1998.
• As the decade ends, Russia's labored journey toward
democratization and a free market economy will continue despite
challenges presented by lawlessness, official corruption,
ecological degeneration, and a struggling economy.
• Russia will continue to act like a world power even though
it lacks the conventional military forces, economic dynamism, and
diplomatic authority to perform like a world power. Although
Moscow views itself as being at one end of a bipolar world,
Russia is likely to be increasingly marginalized in the years to
come.
• When the NATO Ministerial Meeting is held in Madrid in
July, a decision will be made as to which East European countries
will be invited to join NATO in 1999. Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic are leading candidates with Slovenia and possibly
Romania as outside possibilities for early inclusion.
• NATO will remain the premier security organization in
Europe even as the dominant political issue continues to be NATO
enlargement and the adapta- tion of the Alliance's integrated
military command structure.
• Bosnia remains a real concern among European policymakers.
The ultimate resolution of events in Bosnia, especially after the
1998 pullout of foreign troops, will continue to affect the
future of Europe.
• The relationship between China and the United States
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should improve in 1997 because it is in the strategic interests
of both nations. While America's security policy for the region
will remain focused on China and Japan, as China supplants Japan
as the United State's primary Asian trade partner, Washington
will be challenged to balance pragmatism against idealism in its
human rights policies.
• The possibility for war on the Korean Peninsula cannot be
discounted. Evidence of Pyongyang's brinkmanship policies include
its sending saboteurs, spies, and assassin teams to the South.
Look for North Korea to find ways around the Agreed Framework
which is supposed to suspend nuclear weapons development.
• Technological proliferation will be a hallmark of Asia as
it enters the Information Age. By the year 2007, a number of
Asian nations will possess chemical, biological, and possibly
nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Digitized information
systems will facilitate the movement of narcotics and drug money.
• Through 2007, Latin America's democracies, with their
rapidly expanding urban population and problems associated with
unrest and poverty, will face subversion, terrorism,
insurgencies, and coups d' etat. While some democratic
governments will survive in Latin America, drug cartels,
unreconstructed Marxists, and the armed forces can exploit these
conditions. The United States will feel the impact in the form
of drug trafficking and the massive, mostly illegal, migration of
peoples into Texas, California, Arizona and Florida.
• Post-Castro Cuba and a fading peace process in Central
America are likely to warrant U.S. attention over the next
decade. The possibility of deployment of forces, either
unilaterally or as part of a multinational peacekeeping force,
cannot be ruled out.
• Brazil's internal stability bears close watching over the
next decade. Poverty, crime, corruption, and the inequitable
distribution of income, joined by a potential environmental
disaster in the Amazon Basin, will present significant
challenges.
• Throughout the Middle East, the disparity in the
distribution of wealth will continue. A high birth rate ensures a
youthful population subject to disillusion and primed for
violence.
• In the Persian Gulf region, the House of Saud will be
increasingly challenged by those who resent the presence of the
United States.
• Israel and the Palestinians may find it increasingly
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difficult to reach common ground in the foreseeable future. The
status of Jerusalem will be a prominent issue, and one not likely
to be solved by initiatives from the Likud Party. Perhaps more
problematic, Israel and Syria seem far from settling the Golan or
other issues which stand between them.
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THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT
Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
General Assessment.
Over the past 7 years, the outlines of the post-Cold War
security environment have become sufficiently clear to allow DoD,
or Congress, to define the U.S. armed forces' potential
contributions to future national security. Whether that potential
is realized depends less on threats and opportunities of its
allies and enemies than on factors internal to the United States.
The domestic environment within which DoD must define itself over
the next decade will largely be determined by several continuing
trends. Combined, these trends will present challenges to DoD
similar in magnitude, scope, and complexity to those the military
establishment faced at the conclusion of the Second World War.
The Department's ability to meet the challenges posed by
domestic trends will be conditioned by the extent to which it is
able to build and sustain internal consensus and cohesion
concerning the future role the U.S. armed forces should play in
providing national security. Divisiveness among the major
components of DoD, on the other hand, will encourage legislative
intrusion into departmental manage-ment prerogatives.
Additionally, if DoD is unable to clearly establish its relevance
to future national security issues, its preeminence in the
national security arena may erode as other government agencies
receive greater proportions of resources devoted to protecting
and promoting the nation's interests.
Trends and Issues.
Over the next decade, domestic influences on the role DoD
will play in providing for the nation's security will be just as,
if not more, important than international developments. The
following brief summary of domestic trends and the effects they
will have on the U.S. armed forces over the next decade is
certainly not an exhaustive treatment of the national demands,
expectations, and constraints DoD will face. Nor is it a complete
survey of potential DoD responses. It does illuminate, however,
the need for the department to clearly define the contributions
the U.S. military can make to future national security.
• Inaccurate Perception of Threats. The most salient
continuing trend will be the perception of reduced threats to
U.S. vital and important interests. The replacement of the
simplistic bipolar Cold War security environment by one which is
increasingly diverse and complex makes it more difficult for the
Secretary of Defense to explain the links between international
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events and U.S. interests. Equally troubling will be the
difficulty of explaining that such links do not exist, or are
tenuous at best, in many situations where instantaneous media
coverage of international events inflame the passions of the
American public. Thus, the Secretary of Defense and senior
military leaders will be challenged to ensure the nation's
military power is applied only where it is needed and only where
it can have the desired effect.
• Stricter Scrutiny of Defense Spending. The second trend
relates in part to the first. Domestic competition for federal
revenues increasingly will place pressures on the DoD portion of
the President's budget submissions. To the extent that a
consensus on threats and purpose is lacking, DoD's bid for
scarcer discretionary dollars will be harder to justify. Among
the many insights one may glean from the national elections is
that the American public and their elected representatives are
becoming more aware of the potential future consequences of the
large public debt. Just as the public has begun the painful
process of retiring consumer debt accrued over the past decade,
so will the Federal government be forced to address the national
debt in a serious and meaningful way.
• Continued Entitlement Expectations. Another insight from
the elections is that while the American people want the Federal
government to begin a process to arrest the growth of the
national debt, they are not willing to sacrifice government
benefits they feel entitled to receive. Social Security and
Medicare budgetary pressures alone will force radical reductions
in other federal expenditures, if the federal deficit is to be
reduced significantly. The same pressures are felt in DoD where,
when it comes to active duty and reserve component compensation,
quality of life matters, and veterans' benefits, a high priority
on meeting entitlement expections is always evident. These and
other fiscal realities will result in the strictest scrutiny
being applied to proposed defense expenditures.
• Expectancy of Increased Military Effectiveness and
Utility. Ironically, the intense pressures to reduce defense
spending will be accompanied by expectations of increased utility
and efficacy of U.S. military forces. The public and the Congress
will demand utility beyond the ability to win major wars,
although that purpose will remain fundamental. The public will
not sustain a large military establishment designed merely to
react to threats. The nation will expect the positive application
of the armed forces during periods of peace in ways which prevent
the emergence of potential threats and further reduce the
prospect of conflict, and mitigate human suffering.
• The False Promises of Technology. Related to the above
trend is the public's increased expectancy that technology can be
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substituted for people in future military operations. Precision
strikes, from a distance, with relative impunity are being
proffered by some inside and outside DoD as a substitute for the
spilling of American blood in some amorphous future international
interventions. The high-tech weapons systems marketing campaign,
undertaken by some constituencies, began in earnest during the
Persian Gulf War and continues today. Its false promise is that
high-tech machines and weapons can be used to resolve human
conflict putting few, if any, people at risk. Consequently, DoD
helped create a conundrum where it must pursue increasingly
expensive technologies to meet the false anticipations of a
nation that expects the next war to be short, efficient, and
casualty free and that is also less inclined to allocate national
resources for defense.
Ramifications for the Department of Defense.
The challenge for DoD over the next decade will be to prove
its relevance in the face of the aforementioned trends. This
challenge will have external and internal dimensions. The dual
thrust of the current National Security Strategy, to protect U.S.
interests and to actively promote them, will remain valid.
Threats, however, will continue to appear to be receding. The
nation, therefore, will seek to reallocate resources devoted to
national security from national defense to national promotion.
Thus, DoD may be allocated a reduced share of the resources
devoted to national security unless it can show its relevance to
the promotion of U.S. interests. That discussion will be
conducted largely within the framework of the interagency process
but will involve Congress as well.

Improved Strategic and Interagency Planning. If DoD is to
prove its relevance to future national security needs, it must
reform its strategic planning processes to allow for better
integration with the strategic planning of other governmental
agencies. This will require modification of the compartmented
nature of defense planning to better integrate the strategic
planning conducted by DoD components with that conducted by their
interagency counterparts. Warfighting has been, and remains, the
province of the Department of Defense; however, DoD has yet to
make its case and prove its worth in the active promotion of U.S.
interests. The department must develop ways to compare its actual
and potential contributions to national security to those of
other government agencies, and then must communicate its unique
capabilities within the interagency process.
Balancing the Protection and Promotion of U.S. Interests.
The department's internal dimension of the national security
relevance debate will focus on balance, which will become the DoD
watchword. The department will have to address balance within
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several contexts, and each promises to create divisiveness within
DoD. The first balance issue that must be resolved will be the
relative emphasis which should be placed on the development and
acquisition of warfighting capabilities as opposed to those for
promoting U.S. interests by shaping the international security
environment. This is certainly not an either-or situation;
military capabilities can be developed that provide a hedge
against the need to fight and win wars while also providing
utility for active promotion of U.S. interests. The Cold War
paradigm of optimizing warfighting capabilities and merely
assuming they also have sufficient utility for other purposes,
however, will require reexamination.

Balancing Force Structure, Readiness, Recapitalization, and
Modernization. A second, and perennial balance issue involves
force structure, readiness, recapitalization, and modernization.
The elements of this issue are interdependent and the manner in
which they are balanced will turn, at least in part, on DoD's
approach to the previous issue. It is difficult to imagine how
DoD will be able to sustain present force levels into the next
century given current fiscal, social, and political trends while
maintaining adequate force readiness. Nonetheless, readiness will
remain an absolute imperative. The challenge for DoD will be to
design an affordable force structure given DoD's redefined
contributions to national security. It is likely that new joint
and service visions of the future application of military
capabilities will cause force redesigns resulting in lower total
numbers of forces. This may free resources needed to maintain
readiness. On the other hand, as the military continues its
evolution into a 21st century force, the components of readiness
may become inherently more expensive.
Closely linked to readiness is the requirement to
recapitalize the U.S. armed forces. To some extent, the doomsday
scenario of block obsolescence befalling the U.S. military early
in the next century is overstated. Force readiness can be assured
by a combination of measures such as overhauls of existing
systems, service-life extensions, product improvement programs,
and recapitalization expenditures. The recapitalization effort,
however, must be tempered by the need to modernize forces. The
DoD goal should not be to provide U.S. forces with the best
possible technology, because it cannot afford the cost. Rather,
the department's approach should be to maintain the measure of
net technological superiority over potential adversaries that
results in an acceptable level of risk.
In balancing recapitalization and modernization, therefore,
DoD should extend or recapitalize those capabilities which,
although still essential, are either in little jeopardy of being
overtaken technologically by potential adversaries or are
decreasing in relevance to the potential revolutionary
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transformations in military affairs. Conversely, DoD should
modernize those capabilities which are technologically threatened
by potential adversaries and which are in, or moving to the
forefront of the future applications of military power.

Inter-Service Balance. To maximize its future contributions
to national security, the department must achieve inter-service
balance. Service capabilities need to be combined in correct
proportions with different roles, missions, functions and core
competencies blended for efficiency and effectiveness. The
traditional practice of relative constancy in distribution of
resources should have no place in future force planning.
Active Component/Reserve Component Balance. The extant Cold
War AC/RC mix model cannot suffice for the 21st century. Two
solutions may be possible.
-- (1) Retain in the AC the most vital forces while
subordinating peripheral and add-on capabilities to the RC. The
AC forces would be composed of heavy combat forces kept at a high
state of readiness.
-- (2) Put the bulk of the nation's heavy forces in the RC
and populate the AC with forces suitable for the currently more
prevalent applications of military power.
There are, of course, problems with each of these
approaches. If AC forces are kept ready to fight and win our
nation's wars in the traditional sense, they will be less
efficient and effective at the missions they are more likely to
be called upon to perform: the range of operations short of war.
Furthermore, RC forces cannot be counted on to perform the full
range of operations short of war because they are not
sufficiently responsive for short notice crises and the frequency
of activations would burden RC members, families, and civilian
employers. The second problem is that the bulk of DoD resources
would be consumed by forces least likely to be needed. Finally,
it can be argued that this would be the most expensive and least
effective approach. It would be more costly to mobilize, employ,
and then demobilize RC forces needed for operations short of war
than it would be to maintain sufficient AC forces to accomplish
those tasks. Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with
this approach to AC/RC balance, it closely reflects the current
practice.
The second possibility is much more radical and is likely to
find few advocates in the Army establishment who will be quick to
point out that the Reserve components cannot be counted on to
defend the nation's vital interests in crisis situations.
Proponents, however, will argue that the combined effect of the
receding threat of large scale conflict, increased strategic
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warning, and more effective training methods will allow the RC
forces to become sufficiently responsive to hedge against large
scale conflict.
The proposals outlined above are rough, and many
institutional prerogatives will be involved in the resolution of
these issues. But the balance that must be achieved between
Active and Reserve forces over the next decade probably falls
within the range framed by the two alternatives presented above.
How the issue is ultimately resolved will depend upon the precise
national security role DoD assumes.
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ARMY ISSUES FOR 1997
Douglas V. Johnson
General Assessment.
The 1997 Army is evolving from the Cold War Army of the
1980s and early 1990s toward Army XXI--the informa- tion enhanced
force of 2010. The Army XXI force will evolve from today's Army
by incorporating many new technologies on the present familiar
base. It will be a more responsive strategic projection force,
capable of decisive victory on the battlefield through dominant
maneuver and the effective application of precision fires as well
as a host of other missions. Unless there is a dramatic change in
the world situation, elements of the Army of the first decade of
the 21st century will continue to be "forward deployed" in places
like Korea, Japan, and Western Europe, although perhaps in fewer
numbers than today.
At around 2010, despite digitization and the leveraging of
technologies into what were, essentially, late 20th century
weapon systems, portions of Army XXI will be nearing obsolescence
in terms of age of equipment, although not necessarily in
comparison to any competitor. If budget support holds, between
2010 and 2015, the Army After Next (AAN), the first true
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) force, will begin to emerge.
This force will be the first RMA force, the first to truly
capitalize on the RMA potential. The Army's immediate task is to
maintain the world's most flexible, capable Army while
transitioning to Army XXI and envisioning what that truly
revolutionary army, the Army After Next, will be.
The AAN will evolve in a world where uncertainty is the only
real certainty. At best, defense budgets will remain stable, but
there is a real possibility they will decrease. During a period
in which the budgetary and strategic challenges will not
diminish, the Army will have to maintain an increased operational
tempo, sustain readiness, and still find resources to pursue
those technologies most appro- priate for the AAN.
In 1997, the principal struggle will be for budget share.
Support for the Army's position in the Quadrennial Defense Review
is beginning to solidify. There are indications that the
imbalance of the last few years between the power of the joint
and service staffs may have reached equilibrium, but that is not
yet a certainty. Since foreign affairs played only a minor part
in the 1996 presidential and congressional elections, it is
unclear what future levels of overseas interventionism may be,
except that it is almost certain that American soldiers are going
to be in Bosnia for at least another 18 months. It is also
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possible that the Army will be part of a small but long-term
United Nations presence in Haiti since events there are not
nearly so sanguine as they were depicted a few short months ago.
The Army was already reviewing its leadership and training
doctrine when sexual harassment scandals erupted in late 1996.
These training reviews may be delayed if Congress pursues its
current investigations. It is still probable that a new officer
effectiveness report will be in place by the end of the fiscal
year, but revision of leadership doctrine, especially training
doctrine, will likely be affected by the ongoing harassment
investigations.
Trends and Issues.
Despite the uncertainties new civilian leadership and the
QDR may bring to policy and budgets, the following trends and
issues are likely to develop.
• Major steps already taken along the road to a complete
change in the relationship between the Active Component and
Reserve Components (AC/RC) will continue. The infusion of AC
commanders into RC units, the grouping of RC Enhanced Ready
Brigades under a mixed AC/RC division headquarters, the OPTEMPO
of RC units in peace and humanitarian operations as well as armed
interventions have forced this unprecedented integration of
components. In 1997, legal issues will arise, but substantial
challenges to increased integration of AC and RC organizations
and increased RC deployments are unlikely unless there are
casualties.
• The Army will make a major effort in 1997 to convince
Congress and the American people that defense dollars will be
better spent on land rather than air or sea forces. The variety
and tempo of current and projected operations strongly support
this position. Working against it is the tiny Army portion of
DoD's current investment budget, which translates into
significant lobbying pressures on the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) and Congress for other service programs.
• Current OPTEMPO has allayed earlier fears that the Army of
the late 1990s would resemble the Army of the Potomac under Civil
War Major General George McClellan: large and good at parades,
but not to be risked in operations. But there is the possibility
that civil-military issues will emerge as the armed forces
continue to press for clearly defined missions and specified
goals that allow for mission accomplishment and termination.
• The Army is already engaged in world-wide contingency
deployments and that will continue. In 1997, it is likely that a
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reassessment of the Army's combat support and combat service
support structures will take place because these are being
seriously stretched by the extended support operations in Bosnia,
Haiti and elsewhere. Should Arab-Israeli peace talks progress, it
is possible that U.S troops will be deploying to the Golan
Heights as well, and that is not likely to be a short-term
mission.
The Army After Next.
The Army After Next Program, as outlined by the Chief of
Staff, Army, is being developed by Headquarters, Training and
Doctrine Command. The Army After Next will be the first 21st
century force to qualify as a genuine RMA force. The 1997 Army
currently is committed to developing an evolutionary version of
today's fine Army with digital information appliques. Army XXI
will be a further improvement of the same basic structure,
incorporating many of the new technologies currently being tested
at Ft. Carson and Ft. Hood. This force will have significantly
enhanced capabilities, but will continue to look comfortably
familiar. The Army After Next, by comparison, will be radically
different.
There is a myth that the application of high technology can
make it possible for virtually any institution, from the Factory
After Next, to the University After Next, to the Army After Next,
to do more with less. The reality is, however, that after a
certain point institutions must take one of two courses. They can
seek efficiencies and downsize while retaining basically the same
structure and culture. At some point these leaner and meaner
versions of their former selves will maximize their
efficiency/effectiveness ratio and then have to choose between
doing more things less well or fewer things better. On the other
hand, institutions may turn to visionaries for revolutionary new
approaches, new structures, and new methods to accomplish a far
different range of goals. That organization will be doing
different things differently and may, indeed, accomplish a wider
variety of tasks better.
For two decades, some in the Army have been arguing that it
is time to move from a division- to a brigade-based force
structure. This is similar in intent to what evolved in the late
1950s with the short-lived Pentomic Army and in the 1960s with
the airmobile divisions so pronounced during the Vietnam War.
Those efforts indicate a peculiarly American tendency to look to
every advance in technology as a means of providing smaller units
with significant increases in combat power, as a way of both
limiting U.S. casualties and of bolstering battlefield
effectiveness. So far, that hope has proven somewhat ephemeral. A
U.S. division in World War I numbered about 28,000 soldiers. A
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generation later, the typical division numbered closer to 16,000
until it went into combat. Then it was augmented until its size
was much closer to that of its World War I predecessor. When all
the extras were totaled, U.S. Army divisions in Operation DESERT
STORM were just about as large. It may well be that 25,000 is the
base line combat force size for sustained operations. This does
not preclude the creation of smaller brigades or brigade-like
structures, like airmobile units, which can be tailored or mixed
and matched to meet specific operational requirements. The Army
After Next, however, is likely to consist of radically
restructured, smaller units, which have significantly enhanced
capabilities. They must be able to move rapidly over a global
battlefield to strike quickly and precisely and to do so without
the huge iron mountains of combat support of the past. But there
will still be requirements for soldier- intensive conflict
prevention capabilities and peace operations, neither of which
lend themselves to high tech, low manpower solutions.
The Army After Next Program being developed by HQ, TRADOC
will be taking conceptual and organizational shape for the next
decade or more. Various employment and organizational concepts
are currently being examined and debated in conferences and
seminars across the Army. The impact of emerging technologies is
being wargamed even as the plausibility of a wide variety of
global scenarios are being debated in academe and the media. The
U.S. Army War College's Army After Next Special Academic Project
functions in support of the TRADOC program except that it will
keep its efforts focused 30 years in the future and will not be
primarily concerned with the evolution of specific force
structures and organizations. Both efforts are pursuing research
under four broad azimuths:
• Probable geopolitical realities;
• Human and organizational behaviors;
• Evolving military art; and,
• Technology.
The USAWC Army After Next Special Academic Project is an
innovative research initiative employing the talents of students,
faculty and interested others to examine future national security
issues. The intent of this effort is to produce selected USAWC
graduates who have a well founded appreciation for the future,
who bring a disciplined approach to long-range futures studies,
and who are able to weigh futuristic claims in the balance of
plausibility and advise their commanders of the results.
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THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:
ORTHODOXY AND BEYOND
Steven Metz
Assessment.
Within the U.S. Department of Defense, the concept of the
revolution in military affairs (RMA) is moving rapidly toward
maturation. Only a few years ago, the RMA was a new and radical
concept discussed mostly by defense intellectuals. Now it has
entered the mainstream of thinking both in the uniformed services
and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The core
assumption is that there have been times throughout history when
some combination of new technology, new organizations, and new
concepts allowed a rapid and radical increase in the
effectiveness of military units. For American defense planners,
this holds the promise that if they can understand the RMA
currently underway, they can build a future military that is both
smaller and more effective than the existing one.
As the U.S. military has accepted the idea that a military
revolution is underway, far-reaching changes have taken place.
Institutions designed to develop, test, and refine RMA-related
concepts have appeared throughout the Department of Defense.
Government and civilian laboratories are busy exploring new
technologies in areas such as information gathering, assessment
and dissemination, nonlethal weapons, robotics and other unmanned
military systems, and new materials and sources of energy. The
military's intellectual breeding ground--the senior service
schools, journals, concept development laboratories, and think
tanks--have begun to assess and test RMA-related concepts and
notional forces. And service programs like the Army XXI and the
Army After Next, the Air Force's Spacecast, and the Marines'
Project Sea Dragon seek to pull a range of RMA concepts together
and translate them into practical programs.
In 1996, U.S. military thinking on the RMA was codified in
General John M. Shalikashvili's Joint Vision 2010. This provided
an overarching blueprint for force and concept development. As
such, it captures the RMA orthodoxy within the U.S. military and
Department of Defense. In simple terms, Joint Vision 2010
projects no revolutionary change in the strategic environment,
but only in the actual method by which military power is applied.
The primary task of American armed forces, Shalikashvili
contends, will still be to deter conflict and, if that fails, to
fight and win the nation's wars. Power projection enabled by
overseas presence will remain the fundamental strategic concept;
the military forces of other nations will still be the primary
foe.
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In Joint Vision 2010 and the mainstream view of the RMA held
by the Department of Defense and the uniformed services, the
thrust of the current revolution is operational and tactical
rather than strategic. How the U.S. military fights will change
dramatically. Technology will allow greater emphasis on longrange, precision strikes. New weapon types based on technologies
such as directed energy will give military commanders greater
flexibility. Advances in low observable technologies will augment
the ability to mask friendly forces. And improvements in
information and systems integration technologies will provide
decision-makers with fast and accurate information. In
combination, these technologies will allow increased stealth,
mobility, dispersion, and a higher tempo of operations.
Information superiority will be crucial and require both
offensive and defensive information warfare. The most important
operational concepts will be dominant maneuver, precision
engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.
This orthodox approach to the revolution in military affairs
may be right, but then again, it may not be. Throughout history,
there were states which miscalculated the course of military
revolutions. This often proved as dangerous as ignoring
revolutionary change. Given this, the United States must continue
to explore alternative forms and alternative dimensions of the
revolution in military affairs, even while institutionalizing the
mainstream or orthodox approach. American thinking on the RMA
must not become ossified, but must remain flexible and creative.
The continued maturation of RMA thinking thus requires a
broadening of the concept to look at implications and dimensions
outside the realm of military operations, and an extension of
analysis further into the future.
Strategic Issues.
• Despite widespread agreement that an operational or
tactical-level RMA is underway, it is not clear whether the world
is witnessing a true strategic revolution. In contrast to an
operational/tactical RMA, a strategic revolution would entail
radical and rapid change in why and who fights as well as how
they fight. The ultimate impact of a true strategic revolution
would be much greater than the limited revolution projected in
Joint Vision 2010 and other mainstream thinking. Given this,
strategic planners and analysts must monitor macro-level changes
in the wider strategic environment rather than simply assuming
that the current global security system will persist.
• Orthodox thinking assumes that, in the long run, the RMA
will lead to a more economical American military by allowing a
numerically smaller future force to perform the same tasks as the
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existing one. According to this argument, since personnel costs
are higher than the cost of technology, a small, robust force
would be more affordable. This warrants careful analysis, yet so
far there have been few detailed studies of the economic costs of
various future military forces built on RMA concepts.
• The RMA orthodoxy retains many core concepts concerning
organizational structure, career patterns, decisionmaking
processes, and leader development from the pre-RMA military. To
fully consolidate the RMA, the Army and the other services should
undertake a zero-based examination of their core concepts to
assess which ones facilitate the required changes and which ones
are anachronistic.
• Even though General Shalikashvili posited the need for the
United States to attain information superiority in future
warfare, it is not clear what sort of organi- zations this will
require. Eventually, the existing service structure may prove
inadequate. Until then, information warfare roles and missions
will have to be assigned to the services. Currently the most
sophisticated thinking on information warfare comes from the Air
Force, making that service the best prepared to accept emerging
information warfare roles and missions. The other services (and
other agencies of the U.S. Government) must now decide whether
they can contribute to information superiority. In particular,
the Army should assess its role and the sort of force structure,
doctrine and concepts that information warfare will demand.
• Much work remains to be done on the ethical framework
implications of the RMA. As military capabilities change, the
moral and legal framework associated with armed forces must also
be updated. To take one example, nonlethal technologies are
currently under development. While nonlethal weapons seem
inherently more acceptable than traditional ones, there are
hidden ethical issues or implications. Would political
decisionmakers, for instance, be quicker to abandon diplomacy and
resort to force if their military was equipped with nonlethal
weapons? Under what conditions is a commander, or even an
individual soldier, justified in resorting to lethal force if
nonlethal weapons are available? Even thornier ethical problems
could arise a few decades from now. The next stage of the RMA may
be based on a biotechnical revolution rather than information
processing (like the current one). It may even reflect the
melding of a biotechnical revolution and continuing advancements
in information processing. As computers progress, nanotechnology
becomes available, and as new materials and energy sources
appear, brilliant systems, self-replicating machines, perhaps
even cyborgs that have some characteristics of living organisms
and some of machines may become feasible. These things would have
immense ethical implications in the military arena. To prepare
for this, ethicists should be consulted during planning for long-
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term military force development.
• The American military of the 21st century must seek both
effectiveness and efficiency. Making use of cutting edge
technology is one way to do this. But another way--and one that
is fully symbiotic with the technological dimension of the RMA-is to craft more psychologically astute military operations. Sun
Tzu--the master of the psychological dimension of warfare--should
be the patron saint of a future U.S. military designed to
capitalize on the RMA. After all, the ultimate objectives of
military operations are psychological and political. It is
impossible to kill every enemy soldier, so a military force seeks
to impose its will by altering the perceptions and beliefs of
enemies, their supporters, and other observers. Given this,
American military strategists, commanders, and doctrine-writers
should cultivate their understanding of mass psychology,
particularly the psychology of anxiety. The military should make
use of experts in these fields so that doctrine and operational
planning can attain desired psychological effects as efficiently
as possible.
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RUSSIA
Stephen J. Blank
Regional Assessment.
The crisis of the Russian state, predicted in last year's
World View, has become a reality. Currently some 25 percent of
the population in Russia are living below the bare subsistence
level. The economy's monetization is in disarray with firms
increasingly resorting to barter and payments in kind to each
other and to their workers. There are reports of famine in
several provinces. Furthermore, while the economy continues to
decline the government has neither a strategy nor the capital
needed to recover and grow. Prospects for 1997 are no better
than they were for 1996.
According to the Defense Minister, General Igor Rodionov,
not one regiment in the Russian Army is combat ready.
Furthermore, if operations in Chechnya are any indication, the
entire chain of command has broken down, putting command and
control beyond the capability of the Russian military and
civilian leadership. At the level of strategic leadership,
numerous convulsions in top administrative positions have
battered the government and shaken the state. Political rivalries
are being played out as various interests compete for primacy and
position themselves for succession to President Boris Yeltsin.
Meanwhile, Yeltsin keeps the national security and government
apparatus in disarray by creating new and unnecessary councils
and offices within the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign
Ministry as a part of a political strategy of fracturing the
power of various factions and keeping individuals who might rival
him from forming alliances. Consequently, the institutions of
state government have broken down.
Throughout the Russian Federation, the various oblasts and
republics are in a constant battle with the central government
over taxation, subsidies, and issues attendant to federalism.
The Russian government is being "deinstitutionalized" by the
privatization of security policy as individuals, factions, and
lobbies ("clans" as they are known in Russian) appropriate key
areas of foreign and defense policy to themselves. They are
pursuing their own interests at the expense of indiscernible
national interests while cloaking their self-serving activity in
the rhetoric of nationalism. The result is that the hallmark of
democracy, the rule of law and the accountability of public
officials, has been subsumed by individuals, factions, and
interest groups. What in the West is known as a government by the
rule of state law (Rechstaat is the German term) has virtually
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disappeared.
Although the public voted freely, many inside and outside
Russia believe that Yeltsin and his campaign team stole the
presidential elections of September 1996. They contend that the
Yeltsin campaign embezzled state funds to bribe the media and to
support third party campaigns and candidates while violating
campaign spending limits specified by their own government.
Yeltsin's opponents have threatened to postpone other elections
if the results do not look promising and have enacted decrees to
reverse those outcomes they find unappealing. These machinations
suggest that democracy is not what drives the Russian political
process. Furthermore, while communism may be dead, the fraud and
authoritarian approaches that marked its governance in the old
Soviet Union have taken firm root in the Russian Federation. It
is unlikely that Russia will make meaningful progress toward
further democratization.
Unrest is apparent throughout the country. Although Boris
Yeltsin ordered Russian forces out of Chechnya in November 1996,
the fighting there could reignite at any time. Fighting could
spread throughout the northern Caucasus where Russian forces,
acting in a peacekeeping role, are engaged in protracted civil
and ethnic wars. Some might argue that this situation suits
Russian interests because it allows Moscow to retain a military
presence in these zones. But that presence imposes costs that are
increasingly beyond Moscow's ability to sustain.
The economic crisis is deepening across Russia. Shortages of
currency recently led Edvard Rossel, the Governor of
Ekaterinburg, a major industrial city in the central Urals, to
issue a local script, the "Ural Franc," to meet the demand for
money. There are reports that similar issues of script may be
made in St. Petersburg for Leningrad Province. The issuing of
local script is a further indication of the weakening of the
central government as well as a deepening economic crisis.
In many areas, but most especially in the Far East, the only
viable government is that of local gangsters whose sole motive is
profit. They have no concern for anything other than their own
interests and most certainly do not care about economic
integration with foreign business interests beyond what bribes
and cash they can extort. Hence, the future of the Russian Far
East as a gateway for Russian influence in Asia is in jeopardy.
Consequently, Russia will be unable to play a meaningful role in
Asia, and Moscow's power and influence will be increasingly
marginalized.
In the area of foreign policy, there is a consensus among
officials in the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry that
Russia should oppose NATO expansion unless it is given a veto
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over actions that would affect Russia in Central or Eastern
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Their
aim would be to make the CIS a pillar of European security equal
to NATO. Yet officials routinely contradict themselves and each
other on European security issues. Consequently, there is no
clear policy for Europe.
The other issue about which there is broad consensus is that
of Russia's warming relations with China. This is viewed as a way
to oppose U.S. global hegemony and unipolarity. References to an
alliance are increasingly frequent in official and quasi-official
publications and discussions. While better relations with China
will get Russia back into Asia, its dependence on China will also
force Moscow to adopt a role subordinate to that of Beijing.
Trends and Issues.
Given that Russian policy processes for national security
and internal affairs are uncoordinated and incoherent, the
following trends and issues are likely to persist through 1997
and into the 21st century.
• Russian efforts at reintegration of Russia into the world
community as a major power will continue. That this is becoming
increasingly unlikely is not evident to Foreign Minister Primakov
who has proclaimed stabilization of the world and countering U.S.
hegemonic tendencies as goals. While Russia will continue to view
itself as at one end of a bipolar world, Moscow is more likely
to be further marginalized in the years to come.
• The "privatization" of Russian security policy by interest
groups and private agents operating outside state control will
continue. These groups will undercut political interests and
policies like opposition to NATO expansion, closer ties with
China, and reintegration of the CIS.
• The Russian defense establishment remains committed to the
principle of unifying the CIS and is opposed to NATO expansion.
They will continue to push for an arrangement that immunizes
Russia from NATO's military expansion and that gives Moscow a
veto over issues affecting Eastern and Central Europe and the
CIS.
• The defense and foreign policy communities will continue
to push for closer ties with China as a part of their opposition
to what China and Russia are terming "U.S. unipolarity" and
"hegemonism."
• Further progress toward democratization is unlikely.
Indeed, a government by unstably perched men and not of laws will
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continue. A possible takeover by the Russian military at some
time in the next decade, and possibly sooner rather than later,
cannot be discounted.
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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Stephen J. Blank
Regional Assessment.
In Central and Eastern Europe there are two funda- mental
issues. First is the issue of membership in NATO and, to a lesser
degree only because it is a less imminent process, membership in
the European Union. The second issue is the continuing effort to
resolve the Bosnian crisis. The efforts being made to come to
grips with these issues are driving governmental policies across
the region.
It is now clear that only a few states will be invited to
join NATO in a first round of expansion. Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic are solid, first round candidates with Slovenia a
likely possibility. These states are obliged to continue efforts
to conform, or at least appear to be conforming, to NATO
standards and requirements for membership. These standards and
requirements include movement toward democracy and market
reforms, effective civilian control of the armed forces, and a
cessation of inter-state and intra-state ethnic hostilities, such
as that between the Serbians and Croatians in the former
Yugoslavia. The trend toward compliance in these states has
inspired other states in Eastern Europe, most notably Romania, to
launch intensive campaigns to enter NATO by proclaiming their
good faith efforts at meeting NATO's standards for membership.
Bucharest, for instance, recently signed a treaty with Hungary on
the Hungarian minority in Romania. Furthermore, an adverse
economic situation in Romania has made the institutionalization
of free market reforms difficult and there has been only partial
progress toward democratization. For their part, the Romanians
have warned that if NATO does not accept it into membership
sooner rather than later, there will be a domestic backlash
against NATO. Romania's policy is quite typical of the outlook of
a number of states in the former Warsaw Pact.
However, there are regimes like Vladimir Meciar's government
in Slovakia and, worse yet, the former Bulgarian government that
are, or were, regressing in their commitments to democratic
reform. Meciar's government has stated its intention to bring
Russia into a European system. It has also abandoned any effort
at solving its problems with a substantial Hungarian minority
within its borders. In Bulgaria the situation is worse. There the
economy is falling apart and democratic reform appears to be
dead.
Fortunately, the recent elections in Bulgaria and Romania
unseated both their respective governments. This has opened the
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door for more liberal regimes that may be decisively pro-NATO and
EU and inclined to reform. While their orientation is toward the
West, Bulgaria and Romania have a long way to go to meet those
conditions necessary for NATO and EU membership.
How the West deals with those states that do not come into
NATO on the first round, and with the Baltic states, Ukraine and
Belarus, will be a test of NATO's viability as a European
security organization. Those states under consideration for
early membership must conform to NATO's standards and
requirements. Those states that do not make it on the first round
could become discouraged. Complicating this issue is NATO's
ongoing reform of its structure.
Trends and Issues.
Key trends and issues from now through the turn of the
century are as follows.
• Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are most likely to
begin accession negotiations with NATO in 1997. Slovenia may also
be invited to negotiate possible membership with NATO. These
countries must, however, meet the political, financial, and
military requirements imposed by membership and that may foster
internal struggles among political and economic groups in each of
them.
• Russia will remain largely outside this process, dealing,
as it traditionally has, with the major Western powers rather
than the second tier states. Although many will be suspicious
that Russia has not accepted the new realities in Europe,
Moscow's aloofness will prevent it from directly affecting
regional trends.
• NATO troops
political enmities
foreign troops are
to a new partition

will remain in Bosnia well into 1998. Ethnohave not abated and these could reignite when
withdrawn. A relapse into violence could lead
of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia.

• If IFOR pulls out of Bosnia in 1998, a substantial Western
political and economic presence will be required afterwards if a
sustained peace is to have any chance of success. Well into the
next century, Bosnia will test the resolve of Western states
along with their established security institutions.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Thomas-Durell Young
Regional Assessment.
Surely to most observers' surprise, 1996 was an unexpectedly
quiet year in terms of European security and political
developments. Most significantly, the Bosnian Peace Accords
continue to be implemented and conflict has yet to spread
elsewhere in the Balkans. NATO remains vibrant and relevant and
its membership is likely to be increased by the end of the
decade. And, notwithstanding periodic political disputes which
regularly flare up between the West and Russia, those relations
continue to be conducted in a progressively constructive and
businesslike manner. Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude that
the past year was trouble-free for U.S. policymakers. Nor do
conditions portend an equally calm 1997.
As a result of a large international, NATO, and U.S.
presence, Bosnia and the Balkans enjoyed a respite from war that
has plagued the region for the past 5 years. The recent NATO
decision to extend its participation in overseeing the Bosnian
peace process guarantees that NATO and the United States will
remain entwined in the Balkan conundrum through mid-1998. While
events in Bosnia have been relatively peaceful during IFOR's
current mission, millions of refugees and displaced persons long
to return home. Yet, the freedom to return, along with freedom of
movement, are far from a reality, war criminals remain at large,
and implementing the civil portions of the Framework Agreement
proceeds in fits and starts. The establishment of the rudiments
of a national government and apparent fractures within the
leadership of the Republika Srpska offer optimism that a lasting
political settlement is possible. On the other hand, recent
spasms of violence accompanying the attempted return of refugees
threatens to spark a wider conflict that could overturn progress
to date. In an any case, Bosnia will continue to preoccupy the
United States and NATO for the foreseeable future, and will
frequently divert the Alliance from other important tasks.
In Western Europe, the dominating political issue will
continue to be the question of NATO's enlargement and the
adaptation of the Alliance's integrated military command
structure. The issue of enlargement appears to have become one of
not if, but which, countries will be admitted to NATO and when.
Although most officials and analysts see expansion, in some form,
happening before the end of the century, one must recall that it
will take both the approval of 16 governments, as well as
ratification as stipulated by national laws of the treaties
expanding Alliance's membership. In short, enlarged membership is
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likely to dominate Alliance, as well as national, political
agendas as the search continues for consensus on this momentous
issue.
The Alliance is also undertaking a potentially far- reaching
review of its military structure, the Long Term Study (LTS).
Initiated in 1994, the LTS seeks to rationalize the ponderous
integrated military command structure, and better prepare the
Alliance to respond to crises in the new security environment.
Moreover, the structure needs reorganizing to better integrate
new members. Given this ambitious undertaking, and the need to
find agreement among 16 members, it is not surprising that
progress continues to be slow.
Notwithstanding its recent admission of three new members,
Sweden, Finland and Austria, the European Union appears to have
reached a pause in its development. The Intergovernmental
Conference has yet to find consensus on further integration,
particularly in the areas of Common Foreign and Security
Policies. Discussions are expected to continue.
The United States and its allies are finding it difficult to
deal with a more "engaged" France in both the European theater
and the world. Paris continues to pursue its own national
objectives and interests, particularly regarding its new attitude
toward NATO. What is different under the Chirac presidency, as
opposed to that of his predecessor, Francois Mitterrand, is that
Western European patience is wearing thin over France's inability
to cooperate effectively with its allies. Whether France will be
able to reintegrate itself into NATO military structures may well
depend upon its ability to convince its European allies that it
is capable of adopting the operative "NATO culture" it so
singularly lacks.
Increasing frictions between Greece and Turkey have the
potential for fracturing NATO. The Aegean shelf, air and sea
space, the NATO command organization in South- eastern Europe,
and Cyprus remain contentious points of discussion that almost
defy resolution. While seemingly bilateral in nature, these
frictions increasingly have a negative impact on the way business
is conducted in the Alliance.
Trends and Issues.
• U.S. leadership in NATO will remain vital for achieving a
lasting political settlement in Bosnia and the Balkans. The
larger issue is U.S. leadership in Europe.
• The question of which countries will be formally invited
to join NATO and the date of their accession will dominate
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Alliance business.
• The LTS will preoccupy planning and restructuring efforts
within the military arena of NATO.
• Political disputes with Russia over the issue of NATO
enlargement that includes former Warsaw Pact countries will
continue.
• The European Union will search, without success, for
consensus over the issue of greater integration, particularly as
regards Common Foreign and Security Policy.
• The United States and many of its European allies will
remain frustrated with France over its new policy of engagement
with NATO.
• Tensions between Greece and Turkey will remain impediments
to the effective conduct of business in NATO.
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LATIN AMERICA
Donald E. Schulz
Regional Assessment.
At least through 2007, threats to peace, stability,
progressive growth, and democracy in Latin America will come from
political extremes and deeply-rooted economic, social and
political problems. U.S. national interests in the region will
remain basically the same over the next decade: promoting
democracy, sustainable economic growth, a greater regard for
human rights, higher living standards, curtailment of the drug
trade, and stopping illegal migration into the United States.
Most countries will maintain the gradual pace of democratization,
with a few oscillating between democratic form and authoritarian
substance. This trend will be especially apparent where
democratically-elected governments lose legitimacy due to a
failure to meet popular expectations.
A large urban population, with attendant socio-economic
problems associated with decapitalization, corruption, violent
crime, and drug abuse, will create conditions promoting
emigration, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, and an enhanced
role for the military in internal security. Assistance from the
United States to reinforce democratic institutions and build
strong economies will be important, in concert with that
extended by other countries, in stemming authoritarian responses.
The coming decade may witness a significant decline in U.S.
imports of Latin American heroin and cocaine, as these narcotics
are displaced by synthetic drugs which can be manufactured in the
United States. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of farmers will
continue to engage in the coca growing business in Colombia,
Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Especially in Colombia,
narcotaffickers will continue to conduct cocaine-related
processing activities. In Mexico, Central America and South
America, poppy cultivation will persist. Brazil will join the
ranks of the narcostates. Increasingly, these activities,
including the increased manufacture of synthetic drugs, will fuel
growing use of illegal narcotics in Latin America itself.
Economic underdevelopment and wide gaps between rich and
poor will continue to produce high levels of illegal migration
into the United States, mostly from or through Mexico. Refugees
from political persecution will join immigrants seeking economic
opportunity. Caribbean migration will increase substantially and
could very well reach crisis proportions, especially if the
Castro regime comes to a violent end. Economic hardship in Cuba
will continue to provide a strong incentive for emigration, and
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if relations with Washington remain poor, Castro may encourage
further exoduses to release domestic political pressures or to
retaliate against the United States. Economic hardship and
political violence will continue to push Haitians toward the
United States. Additionally, by the 21st century, immigration
from the Dominican Republic will be recognized as the significant
problem that it already is.
The policy answer to most of these concerns is the nurturing
of democracy and sustainable economic growth leading to a higher
standard of living for most Latin Americans. A viable counterdrug
strategy is also needed. Some of these issues have been addressed
in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the North American
Free Trade Agreement, and the Andean Drug Strategy. How to turn
policy into strategy and executable programs will continue to be
the real challenge for the United States.
Trends and Issues.
• Threats to democratic governments will increase as a
result of urban overpopulation and unemployment, socio-economic
inequalities, poverty, weak economies, an authoritarian political
culture, corruption, human rights abuses, and civil-military
conflicts. These elements may be exploited by drug cartels,
radical politicians from the right and left, unreconstructed
Marxists, and the armed forces.
• Environmental degradation and exploitation of nonrenewable
resources will continue. A major ecological disaster is in the
making in the Amazon.
• Synthetic drugs will cut sharply into the heroin and
cocaine markets, lowering the profits of some of the traditional
cartels and weakening them politically. This will be of only
limited benefit to the United States, however, since the overall
U.S. market for drugs will likely grow.
• Illegal immigration will continue to pose major social,
economic and political problems for the United States.
• Peru and Colombia will continue to be plagued by a chronic
mix of insurgency and drug trafficking. The problem will be
especially severe in Colombia and could lead to civil war.
• In the short run, the socio-economic crisis in Venezuela
will continue. Economic hardship will undermine democracy, foster
political instability, and possibly lead to a restoration of
authoritarian rule. In the medium term, however, the economy
should recover, enabling the Venezuelans to muddle through.
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• A new modus vivendi will be reached in the Ecuador- Peru
border dispute, but there will be no permanent solution to the
problem.
• Under the leadership of President Abdala Bucaram, Ecuador
will experience serious political and socio-economic crises,
which will severely test the democratic commitment of the armed
forces and the populace. Ecuador may well become the victim of a
military coup.
• A regional arms race could develop out of Chilean and
Brazilian efforts to modernize their armed forces and ongoing
tensions between Ecuador and Peru.
• The Central American peace process will gradually fade,
leaving unresolved socio-economic and political problems that
will undermine democracy and cause political instability. Levels
of criminal violence, already extremely high, will increase in
the short term and remain a serious problem past 2007. A
regression to large-scale political violence and/or authoritarian
practices is likely in one or more countries.
• Under the presidency of Arnoldo Aleman, Nicaraguan
political violence will intensify. This has the potential to lead
to an authoritarian restoration and/or renewed civil war.
• The political crisis in Haiti will reemerge after the U.N.
peacekeeping force withdraws. This could occur quickly, or it may
take some time. Either way, political instability, violence and
authoritarian rule seem likely to return.
• The U.S. Southern Command will relocate to Miami in 1997.
The U.S. military will probably not retain bases in Panama,
though it might participate in an anti-drug center at Howard Air
Force Base. Whether the Canal will run efficiently under
Panamanian control will depend on the extent to which its
management is undermined by political interference and
corruption.
• While there will be a gradual recovery in the Cuban
economy, the country will still be in worse socio-economic shape
in 2007 than it was in 1989, when the crisis began. The political
situation will become increasingly uncertain because of Castro's
advancing age and related health problems. Political violence and
instability are likely if he dies or is removed from power.
• Puerto Ricans may, once again, have to choose among
commonwealth, statehood and independence. If the U.S. Congress
eliminates the tax subsidy and reduces transfer payments,
commonwealth will lose its appeal, and statehood will become the
most attractive option.
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• The short-term outlook for Brazil is good, but fiscal and
trade deficits persist. Major social and economic challenges
include poverty, violent crime, corruption, inequitable
distribution of income, landlessness, and environmental
degradation, especially in the Amazon.
• The political and socio-economic crisis in Mexico will
continue. The economy will eventually recover, but social
recovery will take much longer. Neoliberal economic policies,
including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), will
continue to pose major socio-economic adjustment problems,
especially for rural areas. Political instability and violence
will continue in the form of guerrilla activities, kidnappings,
assassinations, and human rights abuses.
• The movement to expand NAFTA, stalled since the Mexican
peso crisis, will gradually reemerge. Subregional integration
efforts such as MERCOSUR, a Southern Common Market including
Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay with Chile joining, will
continue.
• The United States will continue to support democratization
throughout the region. Though Washington will be less inclined to
intervene militarily, continued political instability in the
Caribbean Basin will probably lead to one or more such
interventions during the next decade, with Haiti and Cuba being
the prime candidates.
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ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Dianne L. Smith
Regional Assessment.
East Asia and the Western Pacific remain a dynamic region of
the world economically, having overtaken Europe as America's main
trading arena. This shift in trade toward the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and Southeast Asia will continue. The issues of
Taiwan and North Korea, among other factors, will remain
potential threats to the stability of the region and U.S.
interests for the next several years. When Hong Kong reverts to
the PRC later this year, the method and style by which it is
absorbed will presage PRC attitudes towards free market
economics, trade, and human rights. In the longer term, the
proliferation of modern technologies, including those for weapons
of mass destruction, will act as a major force affecting the
security environment.
The People's Republic of China.
Beijing is witnessing its best security position in two
centuries: no regional threats and the return of Hong Kong.
However, the Soviet Union, formerly China's superpower rival, has
been replaced by the Russian Federation, an unstable nuclear
power. Furthermore, around its Central Asian periphery, China
must now contend with a bevy of small republics which are open to
influence by China's rivals and subject to Islamic fundamentalist
ideology which might spill over into China's own Muslim border
regions.
The succession crisis which is sure to follow Deng
Xiaoping's death presages a power struggle between moderate
reformers and ultra-nationalists who will take a more cautious or
more adventurous course respectively in their claims on Taiwan,
the Spratly Islands, and other remnants of the Chinese empire.
This struggle will occur even as China confronts a decade of
economic and social transformation, heightened by inflation,
environmental degradation, depletion of finite energy resources,
the increased political influence of the People's Liberation
Army, decentralization of authority, and economic inequality
among the provinces. Doomsayers who predict the fragmentation of
China into several nations overstate the case, but the shock of
the Soviet Union's demise prohibits outright dismissal of this
scenario.
The United States does not want to replace the Soviet threat
of the last half of the 20th century with a China threat for the
first quarter-to-half of the 21st century. The best way to keep
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that from happening is to factor China into any approach to
issues dealing with regional security rather than trying to
exclude or "contain" Chinese policies. The United States also
needs to pursue policies which will help stabilize the PRC during
this period of further economic and political transformation.
Japan.
While the short-term fallout from the Okinawa school-girl
incident was harsh, it may have resulted in a long-term
improvement in U.S.-Japanese relations by forcing a public debate
on the role the United States should be playing in Japan's
security. That debate seemingly has reaffirmed the importance of
the bilateral U.S.-Japanese relationship and the importance of
the United States as the third leg in a triad among Tokyo,
Beijing, and Washington.
America's growing trade deficit with China should take some
of the pressure off Japan, which felt that Washington's trade
bashing had emphasized trade issues to the exclusion of mutual
security issues. Unless China should act in an excessively
provocative manner, Japan will seek regional stability through
its relationship with the United States over the next decade.
North and South Korea.
Even now Pyongyang threatens to renege on the suspension of
its nuclear program and suspected weapons development program, as
promised in the U.S.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed
Framework. Pyongyang continues to practice brinkmanship to gain
concessions and weaken the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance.
Despite the threats of famine and mass starvation, North Korea
has not released its strategic wartime food supplies. Pyongyang
continues to send sabotage and assassination teams into South
Korea.
Despite the continuing confrontation between North and
South Korea, the next decade may bring significant changes in
their relationship. There is the possibility of reunification.
That would entail fundamental structural economic and political
reforms in North Korea. If the two Koreas are not reunified, a
reconciliation is certainly possible and that would almost surely
involve warmer relations and a softening of Pyongyang's policies
both at home and abroad. Regardless of the scenario, the United
States will remain engaged in this struggle as a result of the
bilateral security arrangements with the ROK and its
responsibilities under the Agreed Framework.
ASEAN.
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The perceived withdrawal of the United States from the
region and fears that a resurgent China (or even Japan or India)
would fill the vacuum gave impetus to the concept of Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) security cooperation and
produced the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. Because it is
the only multilateral organization dealing with security problems
in Southeast Asia, the United States continues to support the ARF
by attending its annual meetings as a "dialogue partner." Rather
than serving as a security architecture, the ARF remains devoted
to confidence-building measures. It has not forestalled some
impressive investments in defense by member states, perceived by
some analysts as a way to discourage Chinese aggression, but
defended by the ASEAN states as normal military modernization
designed to keep pace with rapid technological advances in
weaponry.
The 1996 ARF meeting in Jakarta resulted in Burma being
admitted as an observer. This was in part to counter the
influence exerted by the PRC and as a rebuff to U.S. human rights
concerns. At this meeting of the forum, it was stated that the
ARF would focus on security, transparency, confidence-building
measures, and conflict resolution. These should remain the
primary areas of interest in the decade to come as new states
(each with their own agenda) are admitted as observers, dialogue
partners, or full members.
Economic fora, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) organization, designed to promote trade and investment in
the Pacific basin, will continue to provide a means of promoting
economic and political stability to the region. Strong economies
promote politically stable regimes better able to assuage ethnic
and religious strife.
U.S. Engagement and Military Presence.
The United States Security Strategy for the East AsiaPacific Region, issued in February 1995, pledges that U.S.
military presence will be maintained indefinitely in South Korea
and Japan, the only remaining hosts for the U.S. military in the
region. However, increasingly vocal opposition to the presence of
American forces in Okinawa and demands for their realignment
within Japan have caused shifts in troop levels. The North Korean
threat keeps Seoul from pressing for any troop cuts on the part
of the United States, but popular dissatisfaction with the
presence of foreign troops on Korean soil remains as well.
In the next decade, a number of challenges to the U.S.
presence in South Korea and Japan are likely. Security
reassessments, like that leading to the withdrawal of U.S. forces
from the Philippines, and future budgetary constraints make it
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unlikely that the current level of deployments in South Korea and
Japan will continue much longer. If that presence is to endure
through another decade, U.S. leaders have to articulate a
rationale that will be accepted both overseas and at home.
Ironically, even as the PRC attempts to increase its hegemony in
the region, Beijing tacitly (if not publicly) supports a U.S.
presence in Asia as a stabilizing factor for the entire region.
Trends and Issues.
• Proliferation of the technology for weapons of mass
destruction will continue. By 2007, most Asia-Pacific nations
will possess the technology, and many will have the capability,
to produce chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons.
• The Asia-Pacific region will remain the world's most
economically dynamic well into the 21st century. Asia will
continue to be the United States' most active trading partner.
Wall Street will continue to shift its focus from Europe to the
Pacific Rim.
• The Information Age has reached Asia and the diffusion of
communications technology will have profound effects on business,
industry, education, and politics. Those nations which do not
begin an aggressive program to link into the Internet will be
irretrievably left behind the more advanced nations of the 21st
century. Information control exercised by the more authoritarian
regimes will become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to
maintain.
• America's security policy for the region will remain
focused on the U.S.-China-Japan strategic triangle. As China
overtakes Japan as a trading partner with the United States, and
as it continues its extensive military modernization programs,
its actions will become increasingly vital to U.S. security
concerns. While the United States will continue to support the
cause of human rights throughout Asia, Washington has to balance
those concerns with more pragmatic political and economic issues
concerning its relation- ship with the PRC.
• Implementation of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework
will be held hostage to Pyongyang's continued attempts at
brinkmanship. The United States will remain a central player in
this dispute until it is finally resolved.
• Multinational security consultations in the Asia-Pacific
region such as ARF will continue to mature while they stress
dialogue over infrastructure and security commitments.
• Transnational security threats, like the drug trade,
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international crime, the rise of a culture of violence, and
terrorism will influence all the states of the region.
• Disputes over Taiwan and the Spratly Islands will remain
imbroglios involving not only China, but also its regional
neighbors and the United States. The manner in which they are
addressed, and their resolution, will affect U.S. regional
interests.
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AFRICA
Steven Metz
Regional Assessment.
Ethnic conflict continues to threaten security across SubSaharan Africa. In Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, vicious
civil wars with ethnic dimensions stand in remission, but are
likely to escalate again. Similar dangers linger in dozens of
African states. Other security problems vary in intensity from
sub-region to sub-region. In West Africa, adversarial civilmilitary relations continue to pose a major obstacle to reform
and democratization. "If the military coup has faded out of
fashion in other parts of the continent," writes Howard W.
French, "it is enjoying a strong resurgence in West Africa, where
soldier-politicians all seem to be reading from the same tightlywritten script."1
The most dangerous example of dysfunctional civil- military
relations in West Africa (and perhaps the world) is Nigeria.
General Sani Abacha, who seized power in 1994 after the annulment
of elections by the country's previous military dictator, is
repressive and corrupt. Abacha claims to be leading his country
back to civilian government, but is unable or unwilling to
transcend the greed and ethnic antagonism that destroyed previous
Nigerian democracies. In the face of pervasive corruption,
mismanagement, and a cutoff of most foreign aid and investment,
the Nigerian economy is in shambles. The country has fallen from
being one of Africa's richest nations to one of its poorest.
Ethnic tensions remain high. Meanwhile, Nigeria faces international pressure and diplomatic isolation for human rights
abuses. Today it is a powderkeg. If Nigeria explodes, the result
is likely to be one of the greatest human disasters of recent
decades.
In Southern Africa, the dominant issue is the changing
nature of national security. Until recently, the strategic
geography of southern Africa was shaped by two problems:
apartheid in the Republic of South Africa and Cold War-related
conflicts in Mozambique and Angola. Now these have subsided and
international tensions are the lowest they have been for some
time. This has allowed the governments of the area to reconsider
their approach to national security. According to South Africa's
draft defense white paper of 1995, "Security policy is no longer
a predominantly military problem but has been broadened to
incorporate political, economic, social and environmental
matters."2 While ethnic violence in South Africa could explode
again, organized crime based on smuggling and drug trafficking is
rapidly moving to the top of the security agenda. Between the
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expanding role of Nigerian cartels in the global movement of
illegal drugs and South Africa's transformation into a
trafficking and drug consumption center, Africa is joining Latin
America and Southeast Asia as regions of the world where
narcotics pose a major threat to national security.
In Central and East Africa, ethnic conflict remains the
preeminent issue, endangering not only democracy, reform, and
stability, but also the very integrity of states. The most
dangerous, complex, and vexing ethnic conflict involves the Tutsi
and Hutu. This centuries-old strife sparked genocide in Rwanda 2
years ago and has kept Burundi hovering on the edge of disaster.
In late 1996, it engulfed Zaire and may ignite the disintegration
of that precarious giant. More than a million Hutu refugees from
Rwanda and Burundi have lived in camps in eastern Zaire for
several years. While the Zairian government demanded the
repatriation of these people, most of the refugees refused to
return to their homelands out of fear of retribution from Tutsidominated governments. International pressure and opposition from
Zairian officials profiting from the international aid flows
prevented the forced repatriation of the refugees. The fact that
the refugee camps were dominated by Hutu militias who had
instigated the 1994 massacres created severe tension among Zaire,
Rwanda, and Burundi.
In September 1996, ethnic Tutsi Zairians, fearing that they
would face the same sort of repression and violence their Rwandan
kinsmen saw 2 years earlier, launched an attack on government
forces. A rebel coalition centered on the Tutsi group (with at
least tacit support from Rwanda) quickly gained the upper hand
over incompetent Zairian government troops and their allies, the
Hutu militias in the refugee camps. In the midst of chaotic
violence and an interruption of relief flows, the refugees fled
from Rwanda into Zaire, briefly returned, and then streamed back
toward Rwanda and Burundi when the rebels attacked the camps.
While the rebels routed the Hutu militias, ultimate resolution of
the Tutsi-Hutu conflict is a long, bloody way off.
With the rebels in Zaire crushing government troops more
interested in looting than fighting and talking of a march on the
national capital, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that this
crisis will be the death blow to the tottering Zairian state. A
government of national unity led by Etienne Tshisekedi is
unlikely to solve the nation's deep and long-standing political
crisis. The imminent death of Mobutu Sese Sekio, Zaire's dictator
since the 1960s, is likely to unleash many decades worth of pentup frustration. The result will be violence. While the
disintegration of Zaire would bring many years of violence and
disaster to Central Africa, it may be beyond prevention.
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Trends and Issues.
Four broad issues continue to dominate the African security
environment. All warrant careful analysis as the United States
searches for ways to encourage reform and progress in Africa
given the limits on the economic, political, and military
resources which Washington can devote to that region.
• The sustainment of democracy in those parts of Sub-Saharan
Africa where it has survived depends on continued reform of
civil-military relations, including institutionalization of
civilian control of the military. Such reform will depend, in
part, on the ability of African nations to develop effective
police forces to minimize the military role in domestic law and
order, and to build mechanisms for civilian control of national
security. Increasing cooperation among the armed forces of
Africa's democracies and movement toward reserve-based armed
forces could contribute to the reform of civil-military
relations. The United States must develop programs to encourage
it.
• Conditions in Zaire, Nigeria, and South Africa will
determine Africa's future. Zaire is likely to disintegrate,
perhaps challenging Africa's long- standing opposition to the redrawing of colonial borders. Nigeria could follow. In South
Africa, crime has reached epidemic proportions and could endanger
the economic growth that supports ethnic and racial
reconciliation. Together, these crises represent the greatest
security challenge Africa has ever faced. The lives of millions
of Africans will depend on how effectively the world community
responds to the humanitarian problems caused by them, contains
the violence that they generate, and encourages their ultimate
resolution.
• African leaders are attempting to create effective
mechanisms for regional solutions to regional conflicts. Many
recognize that the interest of outsiders in preserving security
and stability in their region declined precipitously with the end
of the Cold War. As a result, they are seeking to improve the
capability of African states and the Organization of African
Unity to prevent, contain, and solve conflicts and to break the
culture of violence that has developed during the past two
decades. If African leaders are able to build a system for
regional conflict prevention and resolution, it could radically
transform the African security environment. If they fail, Africa
will remain dependent on the transitory interest of outsiders.
The United States is committed to assisting attempts to create
effective regional methods and institutions for conflict
resolution but is unable to devote extensive economic or military
resources to the process. Finding the most economical and
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effective way to use limited American strategic resources to
create the African Crisis Response Force proposed by Secretary of
State Warren Christopher in an October 1996 trip to Africa is,
therefore, a pressing challenge.
• During most of their history, African militaries were
configured for defense against external enemies and for internal
security against political insurgents and separatists. Now the
preeminent threats to national security are things like organized
crime, narco- trafficking, poaching and smuggling, refugee and
population flows, and ecological decay. In response to this,
African militaries must reorganize and reform their basic
concepts, doctrine, and approaches to leadership and training.
The United States and other friends in Africa must find ways to
assist.
ENDNOTES
1. Howard W. French, "In West Africa, Wave of Strongmen
Weaken Democracy, New York Times, October 24, 1996, p. 1 of
electronic download.
2. Defence in a Democracy, draft white paper on national
defence of the Republic of South Africa, 21 June 1965, chapter 2.
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MIDDLE EAST
Stephen C Pelletiere
Regional Assessment.
Two impending crises face the United States in the next
year. First, Washington's position in Iraqi Kurdistan has been
virtually eliminated in the wake of Mosoud Barzani's appeal to
Saddam Hussein for protection against his enemy, Jalal Talabani.
The second crisis that may have almost immediate and perhaps
catastrophic consequences is what will happen among Israel, the
Palestinians, Syria, and Egypt as prospects for the peace process
seem dimmed.
Looking first at Iraqi Kurdistan, Barzani claimed that
Talabani had enlisted the support of Tehran in an effort to make
himself the master of the Iraqi Kurdish region. While this was,
indeed, most likely the case, by going over to the side of
Saddam, Barzani put Britain and the United States, who were
supposedly protecting the Kurds against Saddam, in a very
difficult position. The Allies now have no basis for maintaining
a military presence in Iraq, or even enforcing the no-fly zone
over the northern part of the country. In fact, while the air
mission persists at a reduced size, the ground presence is gone.
The most dismaying aspect of the whole Kurdish imbroglio was
the behavior of U.S. allies. Virtually none of those who
previously had supported Washington's position stood by the
United States when it came to a crisis. With little international
support for its self-assumed humanitarian mission in the Northern
Gulf, Washington now must reassess its strategy for this whole
region.
For the time being, the Talabani forces, with Tehran's
support, will be able to hold on to their enclave around
Sulaimaniya. Barzani, correspondingly, will be able to retain
control of Irbil if he maintains his ties to Saddam. As for the
Turks, they will remain watchful, lest Iran attempt further
intervention in the north. Ideally, Ankara would like to see an
Iraqi military presence return to Kurdistan, but before that can
happen, Barzani has to turn his back completely on Washington;
something he is unlikely to do.
The economic sanctions against Iraq will not end
precipitously nor will they endure. Because no one country will
break the embargo overtly, the economic sanctions will be eroded
slowly as ways are devised to subvert them. Washington, with no
way of enforcing its will upon Baghdad, will be forced to look
the other way as illicit trade with Iraq increases over time.
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At this time, the United States will find it increasingly
difficult to implement Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the no-fly zone
over southern Iraq. Zealous Muslims view the American military
presence with disfavor and the threat of terrorist attacks
against U.S. installations and personnel will increase. There may
well be more Khobar Towers-type attacks as part of an effort to
discredit Arab governments friendly to the United States and to
compel an end to, or a substantial reduction in, the American
presence in the Persian Gulf area. Accordingly, if as some
contend, King Faud is forced from power this year, and if the
succession is not smooth, the United States may find that its
already vulnerable position in the Gulf will become even more
precarious.
The second impending crisis in the Middle East has the
United States suffering an almost painful reversal in Israel.
After supporting the Labor Party government of Shimon Peres,
Washington saw it defeated in last year's elections. The victory
of the Likud Party over Labor doubly dismayed Washington because
the new government repudiated virtually all the peace initiatives
of its predecessor.
Spurred on by anti-Palestinian forces in his cabinet, Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is maneuvering to increase the
settler population in Gaza and on the West Bank. This threatens
to collapse what is left of the entire architecture of the peace
process built over the past few years. Furthermore, if the Likud
government continues on its present provocative course, violence
will be the inevitable result. Internationally, Israel will find
itself increasingly isolated.
There is very little reason to be overly sanguine about the
Hebron Agreement. All Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to was the
implementation of the provisions negotiated between his
predecessor, Yitzak Rabin, and the Palestinians. In effect, the
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians remain stalled.
The really difficult issues, to include the future of Jerusalem
and statehood for the Palestinians, are still to be resolved.
Attempts by the Clinton administration to bring pressure on
the Likud government will be resisted by Israel's supporters in
the United States. When the administration eases its pressure on
Likud, it will feel pressure from its Arab allies in the Middle
East and an increasingly vociferous pro-Arab constituency within
the United States. This will be a difficult year for U.S. Middle
East policy.
Syria is in no condition to provoke Israel militarily. But
at the same time, Damascus will not restrain Hizbollah from
carrying out attacks from southern Lebanon. Netanyahu will have
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to find some way of answering these attacks since invading
Lebanon is not an option with the Israeli public. If the
frustration level grows, Israel may try to mobilize the Christian
community in Lebanon against Syria, a very dangerous escalation
which could reignite the terror war.
Trends and Issues.
• France will continue to provide an alternative to American
leadership in the Middle East. Paris, working through the
European Union, will attempt to exert greater influence on the
Arab-Israeli peace process. Israel will condemn such activity;
the Arabs will applaud it.
• Acts of terror inside the Middle East will escalate. The
Arabs will blame these attacks on the Mossad while the Israelis
will cite renegade Palestinian groups.
• The status of Jerusalem will be a prominent issue in 1997.
Given the current climate in relations between Israel and the
Palestinians, it is unlikely that the Arab nations are going to
be any more accommodating than the Israelis. The Arabs may push
Washington for an unambiguous policy statement on the future of
the Holy City.
• European nations and Canada will be increasingly opposed
to Helms-Burton in 1997. Many countries are going to insist on
doing business with Iran, perhaps even Iraq. Any attempt by the
United States to prevent them from doing so is likely to invite
retaliation against American business interests overseas.
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THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
AND THE ALTERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT
William T. Johnsen
While overwhelmingly for the good, the dramatic shifts in
the international security environment over the last decade have
not eliminated all threats to U.S. national interests. Although
there is general agreement on that point, less consensus exists
on what defense policies and force structures are necessary to
meet the demands of the post-Cold War era. The Base Force and the
Bottom Up Review (BUR) notwithstanding, critics have claimed that
U.S. defense planning lacks a coherent thread and needs further
revision. Increasingly, strategic analysts have called for
periodic reviews to assess the state of U.S. defense policy.
Responding to these recommendations, the latest being from the
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (May 1995),
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry initiated the first
Quadrennial Defense Review.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
The QDR process received additional impetus from the Armed
Forces Force Structures Review Act of 1996 (known familiarly as
the Lieberman Amendment). The act requires the Secretary of
Defense to complete the QDR within 1997. It also stipulates that
the QDR must include:
. . . a comprehensive examination of the defense
strategy, force structure, force modernization plans,
infrastructure, and other elements of the defense
program and policies with a view toward determining and
expressing the defense strategy of the United States
and establishing a revised defense program through the
year 2005.
The Act also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit the
QDR results to Congress not later than May 15, 1997. Moreover, it
specifies that the report include:
(1) The results of the review, including a comprehensive
discussion of the defense strategy of the United States and the
force structure best suited to implement the strategy.
(2) The threats examined for purposes of the review and the
scenarios developed in the examination of such threats.
(3) The assumptions used in the review, including
assumptions related to the cooperation of allies and missionsharing, levels of acceptable risk, warning times, and intensity

40

and duration of conflict.
(4) The effect on the force structure of preparations for
and participation in peace operations and military operations
other than war.
(5) The effect on the force structure of the utilization by
the Armed Forces of technologies anticipated to be available by
the year 2005, including precision guided munitions, stealth,
night vision, digitization, communications, and the changes in
doctrine and operational concepts that would result from the
utilization of such technologies.
(6) The manpower and sustainment policies required under the
defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting more
than 120 days.
(7) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve
components in the defense strategy and the strength,
capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve
components can capably discharge such roles and missions.
(8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces
(commonly referred to as "tooth to tail" ratio) under the defense
strategy including, in particular, the appropriate size and
number of headquarter units and Defense Agencies for that
purpose.
(9) The air-lift and sea-lift capabilities required to
support the defense strategy.
(10) The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other
anticipatory deployments necessary under the defense strategy for
conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated
conflicts.
(11) The extent to which resources must be shifted among two
or more theaters under the defense strategy in the event of
conflict in such theaters.
(12) The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command
Plan as a result of the defense strategy.
To assist DoD in the QDR process, the act requires the
Secretary of Defense to establish a nonpartisan, independ-ent
National Defense Panel (NDP). The NDP will consist of a chairman
and eight members. They will be selected by the Secretary of
Defense in consultation with the leadership of the Senate Armed
Services and House National Security committees. The prospective
members of the NDP, who are to be drawn from the private sector,
must be recognized experts in matters relating to national
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security. The NDP will be apprised of all ongoing work within the
QDR and will submit an independent assessment along with their
recommendations for improvements to the Secretary of Defense not
later than March 14, 1997.
Upon completion of the review, the Chairman of the NDP and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit independent
assessments of the QDR to the Secretary of Defense. The report
must be transmitted to the Secretary in time for his
consideration and inclusion in the final report that is due to
the Senate Armed Services and House National Security committees
not later than May 15, 1997.
Alternative Force Structure Assessment.
Besides its work on the QDR, the Lieberman Amendment charges
the NDP to conduct an Alternative Force Structure Assessment. The
NDP is to examine a ". . . variety of possible force structures
of the Armed Forces through the year 2010 and beyond." In
developing such alternatives the NDP is to analyze and assess a
range of potential threats (conventional threats across the
conflict spectrum; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery means; non-traditional threats, such as
information warfare; domestic and international terrorism; and
possible major challengers possessing military capabilities
similar to the United States) and scenarios (derived from threats
identified, as well as scenarios of lesser and greater magnitude
than those used in the BUR).
The Alternative Force Structure Assessment is intended to:
• "develop recommendations regarding a variety of force
structures for the Armed Forces that permit the forward
deployment of sufficient land- and sea-based forces to provide an
effective deterrent to conflict and to permit a miliary response
by the United States to the scenarios developed . . ."
• "to the extent practicable, estimate the funding required
by fiscal year, in constant fiscal year 1997 dollars, to
organize, equip, and support the forces contemplated under the
force structures assessed in the assessment."
The NDP will transmit its assessment to the Secretary of
Defense not later than December 1, 1997. After consultation with
the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary will submit
a copy of the NDP assessment with his comments to the appropriate
congressional committees not later than December 15, 1997.
Potential Consequences.
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The comprehensive requirements and constrained time limits
contained in the Lieberman Amendment set a difficult task before
DoD and the NDP. As a result, the QDR and Alternative Force
Structure Assessment will preoccupy DoD policymakers for most of
1997. The eventual results of this prodigious undertaking cannot
be forecast with any certainty, but, certainly, the potential
exists for significant change, with attendant consequences, to
emerge from the QDR process.
Whether such significant change will occur remains to be
seen. President Clinton's reelection makes unlikely major changes
in the basic principles that guide U.S. defense policy. The
current tenets are well-established and revisions are more likely
on the margins than at the core. That having been said, shifts in
how those principles are applied or in the emphasis placed on
specific strategic implementing concepts could have significant
ramifications for defense policy.
Changes in National Security Strategy.
President Clinton's reelection also makes major changes in
the existing national security strategy unlikely. Engagement and
enlargement undoubtedly will remain as guiding principles. Nor
are undergirding strategic implementing concepts likely to
undergo substantial change. Deterring and, if necessary,
defeating regional aggressors; providing a credible overseas
presence; countering weapons of mass destruction; contributing to
multilateral peace operations; combating terrorism; and fighting
drug trafficking are likely to remain in effect.
On the other hand, the decision to delay publication of the
President's legally mandated annual national security report to
Congress until after the QDR has been completed may indicate a
willingness to adjust portions of the national security strategy
to conform to recommendations that might result from the QDR.
And, President Clinton's nomination of a new "national security
team" may herald shifts in the administration's emphasis on a
number of strategic implementing concepts. For example, recent
pronounce- ments indicate that the "two MRC strategy" (the
ability to fight and win two major regional conflicts) will be
retained for the foreseeable future as a means of deterring, and
if necessary defeating, regional aggressors. One key difference,
however, is the elimination of the "nearly simultaneous" planning
criteria from the two MRC formulation. This change could have
significant consequences for future force structures, almost as
significant as reverting to a "one MRC strategy."
How much and what type of overseas U.S. presence also may
change. Will overseas force levels be increased, decreased, or
remain the same? Will forces remain permanently stationed or will
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rotating units from the continental United States take on a
larger role? Which types of forces best represent U.S.
commitment? Will exercises become the primary vehicle for
maintaining overseas presence?
Another critical issue surrounds the degree of emphasis and
balance between protecting and promoting national interests. In
the past, much emphasis was placed on protecting U.S. national
interests. This made sense given the extent of the threat in the
Cold War. But, absent such a threat, it may now be possible to
devote greater attention and resources toward activities that
seize the strategic initiative actively to promote U.S.
interests. The degree to which the military may participate in
such activities and the subsequent effect on budgets and force
structures could be considerable.
Changes in National Military Strategy.
Dramatic shifts in U.S. national military strategy are
unlikely to occur. Promoting stability and thwarting aggression
through peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention,
and fighting and winning major regional conflicts will remain
applicable. Nor are overseas presence and power projection likely
to be fundamentally altered.
While the overarching principles may remain largely the
same, the manner in which they are implemented and the degree of
emphasis placed on specific elements may undergo considerable
change. For instance, the strategic concept of preventive defense
recently emphasized three lines of action: prevent the emergence
of threats to U.S. national interests and security; deter any
threats that might emerge; and, if necessary, defeat an
aggressor. Under this concept, greater emphasis would be placed
on preventing threats. Whether Secretary of Defense William Cohen
will continue to stress preventive defense remains to be seen.
But the consequences, especially for the Army which would carry
out much of the preventive defense mission, could be
considerable.
The balance between overseas presence and power projection
may also be altered. If, for example, preventive defense and
peacetime engagement take on greater importance, then overseas
presence–whether through permanent stationing or rotation of
units–may grow. If, on the other hand, budget constraints drive
down personnel levels and forces available, then greater reliance
on power projection of forces from the continental United States
may be more the norm.
Because of the breadth and scope of the tasks laid down in
the Lieberman Amendment, DoD and the NDP will have to examine a
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large number of consequential issues that could alter the
implementing concepts of the national military strategy. To
identify but a few of the critical issues offers some insight
into the potential consequences of the QDR. For example, to
achieve an appropriate balance between:
• Promoting and protecting national interests;
• Preventive defense measures and other activities;
• Technology and people;
• Modernization and recapitalization;
• Budget allocations to the Services;
• Roles and Missions of the Services;
• The Active and Reserve Components;
• Interests of congressional constituents and base closings
that reduce excess infrastructure; and,
• Current readiness, force structure, and modern-ization.
Changes in Force Structures.
While it is too early to forecast outcomes of the QDR force
structure review and Alternative Force Structure Assessment, some
key battle lines have been drawn. Four brief examples indicate
the scope and potential consequences of the debates. The first
instance is the degree to which forces will be optimized for
major conflicts–fighting and winning America's wars–or whether
some forces will be designed to focus on other operations. If,
for instance, preventive defense receives increased priority,
then the nation will need forces able to operate effectively in
that milieu. In a constrained fiscal environment, the necessity
of fielding forces to perform the warfighting and preventive
defense roles may require considerable trade-offs with other
requirements.
Second, striking an appropriate balance between precision
engagement and dominant maneuver will significantly influence
force structures. Stand-off, precision strike weapons systems
will provide critical capabilities on future battlefields. Overreliance on such weapons, however, may leave the U.S. Armed
Forces vulnerable to asymmetric responses. Moreover, while
precision strike weapons systems lend themselves to compelling or
deterring potential adversaries, they are less suitable for
peacetime engagement tasks that may take on increasing importance
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in the near future. Dominant maneuver forces, on the other hand,
are capable of performing across the full range of operations,
provide significant operational flexibility to respond to
asymmetric challenges throughout the spectrum of conflict, and
lend themselves to peacetime engagement activities. Both
capabilities will be essential to meet the demands of the
anticipated international security environment. But achieving an
appropriate balance within increasingly constrained fiscal
resources will not be easy.
Third, the role of the Reserve Components–especially within
the Army–is likely to generate considerable debate. A key issue
will center on using Reserve Component forces to conduct
operations other than war (with attendant frequent mobilizations
and consequent stress on Reserve Component personnel and units)
versus serving as a primary deterrent to a second MRC and
providing a significant combat component to fight in a second
MRC, if required. The potential effects of these decisions on the
structure of Active Component forces, the Active
Component/Reserve Component mix, and the organization within the
respective Reserve Components will be significant.
Lastly, future force structures hinge to a large degree on
the research, development, and acquisition of modern equipment.
The long-standing, but rising, tension between current readiness
requirements (largely dictated by increasing numbers and duration
of deployments) and long-term modernization needs requires
resolution. This may only be possible if there is a break in the
historical DoD budget apportionment paradigm. If such a break
occurs, the ramifications for future force structures will be
consequential.
Congressional Activity.
While there may be considerable congressional discussion of
defense policy issues in 1997, one should not anticipate
significant legislative action. As the recent election campaign
demonstrated, the nation lacks keen interest in or awareness of
defense issues. Time will be required to forge a bipartisan
consensus on defense issues that the Executive and Legislative
branches say they seek. The Clinton administration's new national
security team also will require time to grasp these nettlesome
issues, and Congress undoubtedly will grant a brief "honeymoon
period." Further, Congress may be willing to adopt a "wait and
see attitude" that allows the QDR process to play out before
taking definitive action. Nonetheless, the conduct of the QDR and
Alternative Force Structure Assessment will generate considerable
congressional interest in defense issues in 1997.
Similarly, the defense budget should not undergo significant
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change in 1997. Subsequent years, however, are likely to see
calls for defense cuts in tandem with renewed focus on balancing
the overall budget. This does not argue that decreases in the
defense budget are inevitable. The American public and its
elected representatives have long demonstrated a willingness to
underwrite a substantial defense commitment, so long as they
perceived that they were receiving a fair return on their
investment. This trend could continue into the future, if DoD is
able to articulate a rationale that garners adequate support.
During 1998, however, Congress can be expected to undertake
considerable action–whether as a result of recommendations
stemming from the QDR or because Congress perceives that the QDR
fell short of expectations. In either case, considerable
legislative and programmatic policy changes could occur. But it
will be far better for all concerned if Congress is responding to
QDR recommen- dations rather than because the Legislative Branch
feels compelled (a la Goldwater-Nichols) to spur DoD to action.
As the Lieberman Amendment indicates, Congress may be losing
patience with what it perceives to be a slow DoD response to the
changing international environment.
Conclusions.
In carrying out the mandate of the Lieberman Amendment, DoD
and the National Defense Panel face a daunting task that would be
difficult to accomplish in a stable security environment. But
such stability is not likely to occur in the foreseeable future.
Simply because U.S. policymakers had roughly 50 years of relative
planning constancy during the Cold War does not mean that the
post-Cold War era will lead to a similar period of stability. To
the contrary, the planning constants that characterized East-West
confrontation may have been atypical, and the United States may
be facing a period of prolonged uncertainty in defense planning
issues.
The United States may be best served, therefore, by
preserving a high degree of flexibility in its defense policy
over the next decade. At the same time, the QDR and the
Alternative Force Structure Assessment should focus on providing
the United States with a balanced force capable of operating
effectively throughout the spectrum of conflict, at all levels of
warfare, and across the range of military operations.
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